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Abstract
We study reactions to entry in a Cournot model, contrasting the
case where firms are endowed with unchangeable technologies against
that where technologies are flexible. By the latter we mean that firms
can change the installed production technique at zero cost (fully flexible
technologies). We show that when firms are technologically flexible,
entry can increase equilibrium prices. The analysis is cast in a short-
run time horizon to simplify exposition, but its predictive power may
better relate to the long run.
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1 Introduction
The pro-consumer effects of entry are generally associated to the predic-
tion that industry price is likely to decrease as the number of competi-
tors increases. Formally, in the study of Cournot oligopoly, this prop-
erty is referred to as ”quasi-competitiveness”. Its opposite, namely quasi-
anticompetitiveness, represents the counter-intuitive situation of markets
with prices increasing in the number of competitors.
The conditions for quasi-competitiveness are an object of analysis since
MacManus (1962) and (1964). Thereafter, Frank (1965), Ruffin (1971),
Okuguchi (1973), Seade (1980) and Amir and Lambson (2000) work out -by
means of various analytical tools- the conditions for quasi-competitiveness.1
In particular, Amir and Lambson (2000) find a quite simple condition, re-
lated to the shapes of the (inverse) demand function and of the firms’ cost
function, that guarantees quasi-competitiveness or that leads to its opposite.
So far, the assumption that the technologies available to the produc-
ers are assigned at the outset of the analysis and cannot be changed has
been maintained. In this paper we provide a simple example of an entry
model in which a firm active in the industry may react to entry through
the usual adjustment in the output level but also through the substitution
of the production technology with another one, better tailored to the new
competitive conditions. We show that in this case Cournot competition can
display ”quasi-anticompetitiveness”.
In the example, the possibility to change the production technology
proves to be crucial for obtaining an increase in the market price follow-
ing the shift from a monopoly to a duopoly regime. This point makes our
approach depart from the quoted literature. If firms are allowed to react
in a broader manner to the entry of rivals, then the comparisons between
cost and demand functions represent a part only of the analysis necessary
to assess the properties of industry equilibria. Indeed one has to ascertain
which cost functions will be selected by strategic agents in response to entry.
We shall therefore contrast our assumption of firms displaying ”technical
1Moreover they unveil the tight relations between quasi-competitiveness, uniqueness
and stability of Cournot-Nash equilibria.
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flexibility” with the case, usually treated in the literature, of firms character-
ized by ”technical inflexibility”. In particular, we have in mind a situation
in which a firm can choose among a technology that implies low cost for
large output levels, and one leading to lower production costs at low output
levels.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model, section
3 develops the equilibrium analysis, Section 4 briefly concludes.
2 The Model
We start by describing the technology side of the model. A production
plan for firm i, is a vector, yi ∈ ℜ2, defined as yi = (z, q), where z ≤ 0
represents the quantity of input and q represents output. Y denotes a generic
production set, namely a collection of production plans. Two production
sets are potentially available to the entrepreneurs. The first production set
is defined as follows:
Y K = {(z, q) : z ≤ −1} ∪ {(z, q) : z ≤ 0 ∩ q ≤ 0} .
Clearly the number −1 in the condition z ≤ −1 could be replaced by any
negative real number. The second production set is defined as
Y V =
{
(z, q) : z ≤ 0, q − β√−z ≤ 0} ,
with β > 0.
The two production sets can be thought of as deriving from two ways of
combining the same input. The first requires at least one unit of input in
order to get any desired positive production level, with increasing returns
to scale, and it allows inactivity at zero cost. The second, which implies no
minimum input, displays decreasing returns to scale. Let Ti be the collec-
tion of production sets available to a generic firm i, and denote with Ti the
generic element of Ti. Then we assume Ti = {Y K , Y V } for any active firm.
We define technology choice by a firm as the selection of one element from
the set Ti. This choice determines the firm’s production costs, which are
straightforwardly derived. Formally, for each technology, there exists a min-
imum quantity of input necessary to produce the output level qi, denoted
3
z(Ti, qi). Clearly, z(Y
K , qi) = −1, and z(Y V , qi) = −(1/β2)q2i . In case Y K
is chosen the total cost borne for producing any quantity is CK = F , where
F = wˆ and wˆ is the (constant) unit price of input. In case Y V is selected the
cost function writes CV (q) = (c/2)q
2, with c = 2(wˆ/β2). It is worth to re-
mark that neither technology is more efficient than the other. Their relative
efficiency depends on the firm’s production scale, with Y K leading to lower
total cost for large production levels and Y V for low levels. By contrast,
Y K implies increasing, while Y V constant (and nil), marginal costs.
On the consumption side, we adopt the linear specification of inverse
market demand for a homogeneous commodity:
p(q) = a− bq,
where p denotes the market price and q is the total quantity produced, a
and b are, as usual, positive constants.
Notice that if both Y K and Y V belong to Ti, then ex-ante firm i is
endowed with a production set which is Y K ∪Y V . At the production stage,
however, once the choice over Ti has been made, the production set reduces
to the one that has been chosen. A firm first chooses its technology, then
chooses its production plan, yi, aiming at maximizing profits. Formally,
letting Tˆi ∈ Ti denote the technology chosen by firm i, firm i’s output choice
problem is
max
yi∈Tˆi
pii(yi), (1)
where pii(·) denotes the profit function pii(yi) = p(q)qi − wˆz(Tˆi, qi). Letting
y(Tˆi) denote the solution to problem (1) for firm i, technology choice is given
by the solution to
max
Ti∈Ti
pii(y(Ti)). (2)
In the ensuing analysis we shall indifferently refer to the production set
Y K or to ”technology K” and to the production set Y V or to ”technology
V ”. We shall also adopt the standard techniques of profit maximization
with respect to output, qi, for a given cost function.
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3 Equilibrium Analysis
We shall perform equilibrium analysis treating first the optimal choices of
a monopolist and then moving to the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of
a symmetric duopoly. The comparison between the two market structures
will shed light on the quasi-anticompetitiveness of the model, as one can
juxtapose the two examples by considering duopoly as deriving from entry
by a new competitor into a monopolized market. In particular we will show
that there exist non-degenerate parametric configurations under which a
monopolist chooses technology K, while two duopolists choose technology
V . Hence, entry by a second firm, under full flexibility, leads to a change
in technology by the former monopolist and finally to an increase in the
equilibrium price.
3.1 Monopoly
Assume that a single firm is active on the market, label it M and exclude
the threat of entry. If the firm selects the K-technology for production, the
solution to problem (1) yields a profit-maximizing quantity, qK
M
, and unit
price, pK
M
, given as qK
M
= a/(2b) and pK
M
= a/2; the profit level, piM (q
K
M
), is
piM (q
K
M ) =
a2
4b
− F. (3)
Similarly, if it selects the V technology, optimal quantity and market price
are qV
M
= a/(2b+ c) and pV
M
= (b+ c)qV
M
, with associated profits
piM (q
V
M ) =
a2
4b+ 2c
. (4)
Letting a2c/(8b2 +4bc) ≡ F II , direct comparison between (3) and (4) shows
that
piM (q
K
M ) > piM (q
V
M )⇔ F < F II . (5)
We can then state the following
Lemma 1 (i) If F < F II the monopolist chooses technology K and mar-
ket price is pK
M
= a2 .
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(ii) If a2/(4b) > F > F II the monopolist chooses technology V and market
price is pV
M
= a(b+c)2b+c .
3.2 Duopoly
Assume now that another firm enters the market. From now on we shall
label the ”incumbent” -former monopolist- firm 1 and the ”entrant” firm 2.
In response to the new competitive framework, firm 1 modifies the quantity
supplied to the market and -eventually- changes the technology chosen for
producing it. Similarly, firm 2 selects its own technology from the set T2
and then sets quantity taking into account its opponent’s decisions; in other
words both firms will solve strategically problem (1).
In order to formally study the strategic interaction between firms we set-
up a simultaneous-move two-stage game, Γ, in which firms 1 and 2 first select
which technology to use and then choose the quantity to produce, aiming at
profit maximization. For the purpose of our analysis we first focus on the
conditions leading to the specific symmetric duopoly equilibrium in which
both firms select the decreasing returns to scale technology V .2 If both firms
at the first stage select the production set Y V , then Cournot equilibrium
quantities and price are3
qV Vi =
a
3b+ c
and pV V =
a(b+ c)
3b+ c
, for i = 1, 2; (6)
with corresponding equilibrium profits
piV Vi =
a2(2b+ c)
2(3b+ c)2
. (7)
Both firms choosing V at the first stage and then setting quantity a/(3b+c)
is a SPNE of Γ if there are no advantageous unilateral deviations from this
strategy for one firm. In order to check this consider the case in which firm
1 chooses the K technology while firm 2 still selects the V one. In this case
2It is quite superfluous, for the purposes of this paper, to provide a full taxonomy of the
possible (subgame-perfect) Cournot-Nash equilibria of the game Γ. For a brief discussion
on this issue see the comments after Lemma 2 on page 7.
3The notation V V stands for ”firm 1 chooses technology V and firm 2 chooses tech-
nology V ”.
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firm’s quantities and industry price write as4
qKV1 =
a(b+ c)
b(3b+ 2c)
; qKV2 =
a
3b+ 2c
and pKV =
a(b+ c)
3b+ 2c
, (8)
with profits,
piKV1 =
a2(b+ c)2
b(3b+ 2c)2
− F and piKV2 =
a2(2b+ c)
2(3b+ 2c)2
. (9)
It is straightforward to see that piV V1 ≥ piKV1 , namely that choosing V against
firm 2 choosing V is optimal for firm 1 if, and only if
F ≥ F I , (10)
where F I > 0.5
By symmetry, condition (10) guarantees that the best reply of firm 2
against V is V itself. We summarize this result in the following
Lemma 2 Let F I < F . Then at the unique SPNE of the game Γ both firms
choose the decreasing returns to scale technology V and equilibrium price is
pV V = a(b+ c)/(3b + c).
Easy calculations show that
F I < F II∀ {a, b, c} > 0.
We do not describe in full the other possible equilibria, for lower values
of F . There are parameter regions where one firm chooses Y K and the
other Y V , and parameter regions where both choose Y K . The main result
deriving from our example can be stated as follows:
Proposition 1 (i) If F I < F < F II and b < c, then entry by one firm
into the monopolized industry leads to an increase in industry price.
(ii) If F < F I entry entry by one firm into the monopolized industry leads
to a lower price.
4The notation KV stands for ”firm 1 selects K and firm 2 selects V ”.
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F
I =
a
2
c(15b3 + 24b2c + 12bc2 + 2c3)
2b(3b + c)2(3b + 2c)2
.
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Proof.
(i) If F I < F < F II , by Lemma 1 we know that the monopolist se-
lects technology K, with equilibrium price pK
M
, and by Lemma 2
both duopolists choose V , with equilibrium price pV V . The difference
pK
M
− pV V = a(b−c)2(3b+c) is negative if and only if b < c.
(ii) If F < F I , after entry at least one firm chooses the K-technology. It
can be checked that the duopoly equilibrium price always falls short
a
2 = p
K
M
, the monopoly one.
The intuition behind part (i) of Proposition 1 is as follows. Entry leads
the incumbent to reduce the quantity it supplies to the market, in response
to the decrease in its residual demand. This standard effect positively affects
prices. In our case, in addition, the reduction in the incumbent’s quantity is
accompanied by a shift from the increasing returns to scale technology—
which is, from the single firm’s standpoint, better suited for large-scale
production—to the decreasing returns to scale one—more efficient at low
production regimes. This technological change, allowed by the assumption
of technical flexibility, increases the marginal production costs of the in-
cumbent, reducing even further its optimal output level. If the industry’s
features are such that the entrant chooses the V technology as well, the
quantity it supplies to consumers fails to compensate the reduction oper-
ated by firm 1.
Part (ii) of Proposition 1 is (standardly) explained by the combination
of increased competition with possibly lower marginal production costs.
4 Conclusion
The result stated in part (i) of Proposition 1 is the core result of our example:
using specifications of production sets commonly adopted in the economic
literature we proved that letting an incumbent react to entry by modifying
both the quantity of good supplied to the market and the manner that good
is produced can result in an increase in equilibrium price.
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Notwithstanding this, there are parameter regions in which the exam-
ple is quasi-competitive, so that entry lowers the market price (part (ii)
of Proposition 1); these regions correspond to situations in which, at equi-
librium, the incumbent does not abandon the K technology in response
to entry.6 Moreover it can be easily checked that if the incumbent were
committed to the technology chosen when enjoying monopoly power, entry
would always lower prices, so that our example would display the quasi-
competitiveness property.
These observations strengthen our initial claim that the assessment on
the benefits from competition may be distorted by the assumption of techni-
cal inflexibility. Indeed the option to change the production technology and
the decision to exercise this option prove to be crucial for observing a market
price increase after entry. As a consequence, the time dimension emerges
as another central feature for these issues: the long run effects of entry on
prices, when firms are technically flexible by definition, may have opposite
sign than those in the short run, when firms are subject to (some degree of)
technical inflexibility. The role played by different marginal costs is crucial
as well: their increase following the shift in technology, even if optimal from
the firms’ viewpoint, translates into a decrease in quantity, and hence an
increase in market price, which reduces consumers’ surplus.
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